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No Man Is An Island In Defense
Procurement: Developments In EU
Defense Procurement Regulation And Its
Implications For The U.S.
Introduction—The Russian invasion of Ukraine
and the United Kingdom’s exit from the European
Union have focused minds on the EU’s role as a
defense actor. In the context of defense procurement, this includes whether the EU should itself
co-fund cooperative programmes with Member
States, what can be commonly procured, and how.
The U.S. faces the obvious dilemma of needing to
be seen to encourage EU initiatives which, if successful, would reduce reliance on the U.S. within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
while also securing U.S. industry’s continued access
to the European defense market(s). We explore the
latest EU initiatives with a particular emphasis on
implications for the U.S. For a useful introduction
see Luke Butler, “Developments and Directions in
EU Defense Procurement Regulation, and implications for the Defense Relationship between the EU
and the UK,” mostlyprocurement.typepad.com/myblog/2022/11/developments-and-directions-in-eudefence-procurement-regulation-and-implicationsfor-the-defence-re.html.
Context—Historically, the U.S. has played a
formative role in developing defense cooperation
within Europe. U.S. calls to rearm West Germany
helped prompt proposals for the 1952 European Defense Community Treaty. This would have created
4-282-976-8
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highly integrated European defense policies and
institutions. Its non-ratification set the trajectory
for what has become largely intergovernmental
cooperation within EU Treaty structures. The
European Defense Agency supports cooperative
European defense projects, but the Member States
within the EU decide on funding, and whom to cooperate with, and how, in accordance with national
defense policies.
However, in 2009, the EU sought to harness its
supranational internal market competences to address defense procurement. Historically, Member
States invoked Article 346 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), an
essential security interest derogation, to exempt
much defense procurement from compliance with
internal market rules. This resulted in protectionist national defense markets. The response, EU
Directive 2009/81/EC, was designed to open up the
award of defense contracts to EU-wide competition
through rules specially adapted to accommodate
defense interests and thus reduce recourse to Article 346 TFEU. In the U.S., concerns were raised
about the potential of the 2009 directive to lead
to protectionism. E.g., Yukins, Feature Comment,
“The European Defense Procurement Directive: An
American Perspective,” 51 GC ¶ 383.
In hindsight, the U.S. need not have been too
worried. First, no formal European preference was
stated. The 2009 directive permits third country
participation in procurement. While the EU Defense Directive provides no legal guarantees of
non-discrimination and equal treatment, the U.S.
has signed bilateral reciprocal defense procurement agreements with a number of European
countries (but not the EU directly) which provide
political guarantees of open defense markets
across the Atlantic. Drew B. Miller, Note, “Is It
Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement
1
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Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93 (2009). The
reciprocal defense procurement agreements, as
implemented in U.S. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement pt. 225, also provide
waivers of U.S. domestic preferences for these
“qualifying countries” which enter into reciprocal agreements with the U.S. Department of
Defense, a status easily revoked if guarantees
are not respected. Second, the European Defense
Directive contains important exclusions, not
only for collaborative procurement between EU
Member States to enable flexibility but also for
procurement undertaken through NATO. Third,
by whatever measure, the Directive has had
limited impact on defense procurement in the
EU. A 2021 evaluation report by the European
Parliament acknowledged “uneven use and low
degree of application,” and that the focus now is
simply on improving implementation of the 2009
directive. European Parliament, Report on the
Implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, Concerning Procurement in the Fields of Defence and
Security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, Concerning the Transfer of Defence-Related Products, No.
A9-0025/2021, www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/A-9-2021-0025_EN.html.
Meanwhile, key aspects of U.S. weapons sales
to Europe are not subject to EU regulation under
the Directive. One prime area of exclusion is foreign military sales. Although outside the European
Union, for a sense of scope, the U.S. has $595.9
million in active government-to-government sales
cases with Ukraine; key items include Javelin
anti-armor missiles funded by a mix of U.S. foreign
military financing and Ukrainian national funds.
See U.S. State Department, U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine, www.state.gov/u-s-securitycooperation-with-ukraine/.
Another area largely outside the EU Defense
Directive is “offsets”—offsetting compensation
(typically in the form of technology transfers or
locally acquired goods or services) that purchasing
governments often require of defense contractors.
Offsets fall in a political and legal no-man’s land
where foreign governments and contractors must
negotiate a via media—a “middle way.” As the
European Commission has observed, the Directive cannot “allow, tolerate or regulate” offsets,
which leaves offsets to possible justification under
Article 346 TFEU. Article 346 reserves to each EU
2
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Member State the authority to “take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection
of the essential interests of its security which are
connected with the production of or trade in arms,
munitions and war material,” and those measures
may include offsets as part of a weapons purchase.
See European Commission, Directive 2009/81/EC
on the award of contracts in the fields of defence
and security – Guidance Note – Offsets (2016) (“As
restrictive measures infringing primary law, offset
requirements can only be justified on the basis of
one of the Treaty-based derogations, in particular
Article 346 TFEU. However, these derogations
must be limited to exceptional and clearly defined cases, and the measures taken must not go
beyond the limits of such cases. They have to be
interpreted strictly, and the burden of proof that
the derogation is justified lies with the Member
State which invokes it.”), ec.europa.eu/docsroom/
documents/15413/attachments/1/translations/.
The U.S. also maintains a “hands off” policy regarding offsets, but recognizes their utility. See,
e.g., Daniel Schoeni, “Defense Offsets and Public
Policy: Beyond Economic Efficiency,” 76 Air Force
L. Rev. 95 (2016).
The upshot is that the EU is not characterized
by an increasingly autonomous European defense
industrial base and an EU-wide defense market
feeding a European preference—the vision of many
at the time of the 2009 Defense Directive. Since
2017, the EU has begun to address a root problem
of how to incentivize cooperative defense procurement between the Member States which could, in
turn, drive industrial and market development.
Of course, this was spurred in part by President
Trump’s stance on NATO, the UK’s exit as a major
defense player within the EU, and the need for accelerated and increased defense spending in light
of Russian aggression. It has been observed that
the direct involvement of third countries will be
necessary to coordinate priorities, foster technology and material transfer, screen for investments
by rivals, and monitor end-use of military capabilities. In this light, the issue arises as to how to
synchronize third country participation in EU initiatives. See S. Blockmans, “Keeping Up with the
Emerging European Defence Union: Synchronising
Third Country Participation,” Norwegian Institute
of International Affairs, Research Paper – 2/2022,
www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/
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keeping-up-with-the-emerging-european-defenceunion-synchronising-third-country-participation.
European Defense Fund—An important
development to observe is that the EU is now beginning to fund collaborative projects in defense
through the European Defense Fund (EDF). Whatever the sums (and they are not substantial), these
research and development grants involving the
use of EU funds rather than exclusively Member
State financing means that there is now “top down”
support for projects driven “bottom up” through
Member State proposals. In 2017, the EDF was
established. See European Union, European Defence Fund, defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/
eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en.
As indicated, the sums are not substantial by U.S.
standards of defense spending. For 2021–2027, €8
billion (€2.7 billion for research; €5.3 billion for
development) has been allocated through the EDF.
Its relatively small scale is further evidenced by
the fact that the EDF is intended to incentivize
cross-border small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) participation by providing higher funding
rates and favoring projects by consortia which include SMEs and which focus on innovation: four to
eight percent of the budget will be set aside to support innovative disruptive technologies for defense
that will boost Europe’s long-term technological
leadership and contribute to high-end defense
products. Research activities can be funded up
to 100 percent while development activities have
different funding rates between 20–80 percent
from prototyping to certification. Generally, only
collaborative projects are eligible, and those must
include at least three Member State participants/
associated countries. However, an important limitation is that the Fund does not cover acquisition
itself. As with many of the new EU initiatives,
the actual mechanisms for procuring the results
(awarding contracts, subcontracts, and workshare
etc.) are left to coordination between Member
States. To confirm, no capability will be owned by
the EU. If eligible, activities developed through
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
(discussed below) may receive a higher EU funding rate.
On launch, the EDF was identified as a major
potential barrier to transatlantic defense procurement, including possibly violating the reciprocal
defense procurement agreements between the U.S.
© 2022 Thomson Reuters

¶ 332
Department of Defense and its counterpart ministries of defense in the European Union. See, e.g.,
Yukins, Feature Comment: “European Commission Proposes Expanding The European Defence
Fund—A Major Potential Barrier To Transatlantic
Defense Procurement,” 60 GC ¶ 196. As a result,
the EDF triggered sharp objections from the U.S.
See, e.g., Daniel Fiott, “The Poison Pill: EU Defence on U.S. Terms?” (EU Institute for Security
Studies 2019) (recounting U.S.-EU exchange).
In 2021, an EDF Regulation was adopted laying
down its budget and the forms of, and rules for,
EU funding. Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2021 Establishing the European Defence Fund
and Repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, OJ L
170 (12 May 2021), pp. 149–177. As these provide
a clearer indication on the treatment of third
country participation, it is useful to revisit the
EDF Regulation’s formal implications for the U.S.
First, the EDF Regulation does limit the eligible legal entities who can participate. Recipients
and subcontractors involved must not be subject
to “control” (Art. 2(6)) by a “non-associated third
country” or entity (Art. 2(24); (Art. 9(3)). The rationale appears to be two-fold. The first is one of
principle in that the Fund aims to enhance the
competitiveness and efficiency of the EU’s defense
industry (Art. 15.) The second concerns protection
of Member State and, apparently, EU security
interests. It is stated that the infrastructure, facilities, assets and resources of recipients and subcontractors involved should be located on Member
State territory for the duration and have their
executive management structures so located. Id.
It is equally important to acknowledge, though,
the pragmatic reality that third country controlled
legal entities can still participate. By way of “derogation,” a third country controlled legal entity
shall be eligible to be a recipient or subcontractor, although subject to guarantees established in
accordance with national procedures which may
refer to the legal entity’s executive management
structure and specific governmental rights in that
control (Art. 9(4) and Recital 16.) Essentially, the
guarantees have to ensure that any control does
not restrict access to resources, intellectual property, etc., that third country access to sensitive
information is prevented (which includes rules
on handling classified information) (Art. 27), that
3
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national security clearances must be in place as
appropriate, and that ownership of the intellectual property and the results must remain with
the recipient during and after completion and not
be subject to third country control or restriction,
nor exported without the Member State’s approval
(Art. 9(4) and Recital 16). There are also other
apparent accommodations; for example, where no
“competitive substitutes” are readily available in
the EU, recipients and subcontractors may use
their assets and resources located outside the EU;
the costs related to those activities shall not be
eligible for support from the Fund (Art. 9(5)). In
addition, recipients and subcontractors may cooperate with legal entities established outside Member States’ territories subject to limitations to the
effect that there shall be no unauthorized access to
classified information or potential negative effects
on security of supply; the costs related to those
activities shall not be eligible for support from
the Fund (Art. 9(6)). It follows that the products
of research and development must not be subject
to third country control or restriction, including
in terms of technology transfer (Articles 20, 23).
At this stage, it is perhaps too early to determine the potential impact, if any, that the legal
niceties of various tests under the EDF Regulation
(for example, the question of “control” (the ability
to exercise a “decisive influence” etc.), or the requirements for guarantees regarding technology
controls) will actually have on U.S. firms’ participation under the EDF. While, in theory, these
look like broad restrictions with some potential
sticking points (intellectual property retention
and use always being one), it is difficult to see
how these conditions can be substantially enforced
within a skeletal framework. There is also the
fact that the U.S. is participating in EDF-funded
projects through the EU’s Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) initiative—€1.7 billion of
EDF funding is available for the PESCO Military
Mobility project involving the U.S., Canada and
Norway. See Council of the European Union, Press
Release, “PESCO: Canada, Norway and the U.S.
will be invited to participate in the project Military
Mobility” (6 May 2021).
Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO)—Under PESCO, EU Member States
have “launched several initiatives to step up
security and defence cooperation within the EU
4
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framework.” European Union External Action
Service, “Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO) – Factsheet” (March 25, 2022). These
PESCO initiatives can be funded through the EDF.
Articles 42, 46 and Protocol No.10 of the Treaty
on the European Union already provide a legal
basis for Member States which have made mutual
commitments to one another to develop defense
capabilities through national and European programmes. PESCO is also acknowledged to be a
response to repeated demands for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing. Council Decision (CFSP)
2017/22315 (eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D2315) formally established PESCO commitments and governance,
and 25 Member States have joined. What is said
to distinguish PESCO is the legally binding nature
of the commitments undertaken, albeit again in a
skeletal form. Without going into too much detail,
it sets the terms for participation which is voluntary and provides a means by which participating
states can initiate project proposals and set arrangements for cooperation and project management. The European Council provides strategic
direction on various matters, such as establishing
governance rules for projects and the general conditions for exceptional third state participation
(on which see below). In terms of financing, the
operating expenditures for projects are supported
primarily by participating Member States. Contributions from the general EU budget may be made
to such projects. However, PESCO assets remain
Member State-owned. More broadly, the Council
Decision also sets out 20 so-called “more binding
commitments,” e.g., to increase national defense
spending. There are currently 60 PESCO projects
being developed (www.pesco.europa.eu/) and the
EU has also acknowledged Ukraine’s wish to join
PESCO projects.
The formal position is that third countries
can be invited to participate in PESCO but only
exceptionally. This reportedly led the U.S. to indicate potential retaliation in the form of reciprocal
restrictions on EU companies operating in the
U.S. defense market. See Guy Chazan & Michael
Peel, “U.S. Warns Against European Joint Military
Project: Washington Letter to Brussels Threatens
Retaliation if American Groups Are Shut Out,” Fin.
Times, May 14, 2019. However, for all the political
symbolism of rendering third party participation
© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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exceptional, it is worth acknowledging that some
EU Member States (e.g., Poland, which has since
become a strategically significant player in the
Ukraine war) were particularly vocal on the centrality of third country participation as the only missing piece within PESCO’s institutional framework.
Andrzej Sadoś, “How to Further Develop European
Security and Defence Cooperation” (Nov. 6, 2022),
www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/
opinion/how-to-further-develop-european-securityand-defence-cooperation/. Indeed, it is understood
but unconfirmed that the position on third country
participation was resolved even before the rules
on PESCO, although the U.S. intended to keep
pressing for changes. See Steven Erlanger, “Europe Vows to Spend More on Defense, but U.S.
Still Isn’t Happy,” N.Y. Times, June 6, 2019. In
2020, Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639 (eur-lex.
europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/1639/oj) was published
establishing the general conditions for third country participation.
As indicated, in May 2021, the U.S., Canada
and Norway were invited to join the PESCO Military Mobility project (www.pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility/) to facilitate cross-border
troop and equipment movement and to harmonize
transportation rules. The UK has also since joined.
Further, the benefits of certain PESCO projects
for NATO have also been identified as initiatives
that benefit the U.S. strategic position in Europe,
such as the TIGER Mark III attack helicopter upgrade to be performed by Airbus. See Chris Riehl,
“PESCO is in the American Interest,” International Affairs Rev., 1 Apr. 2022, www.iar-gwu.org/
blog/a535fp9un5oo9hqv8d7olhyxwq23b5; “France
and Spain launch Tiger MkIII programme”
(March 2, 2022), www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/
press-releases/2022-03-france-and-spain-launchtiger-mkiii-programme.
Common Procurement—In March 2022, the
EU published its Strategic Compass Plan setting
out the EU’s ambition for defense and security. See
www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-eu-0_
en. One aspect relating to procurement is the EU’s
efforts to increase common procurement, i.e., not just
the funding of development but also the buying of
equipment. To this effect, a Communication has been
published on joint acquisition of military equipment,
strategic defense programming and supporting the
European industrial base. See European Commis© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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sion, EU Steps Up Action to Strengthen EU Defence
Capabilities, Industrial and Technological Base:
Towards an EU Framework for Joint Defence Procurement (May 18, 2022), ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3143. An EU Defense
Joint Procurement Task Force has been established
to work with Member States to support coordination of their procurement needs and military assistance to Ukraine.
This is reinforced by a draft proposal for a
Regulation establishing a European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) for 2022–24, ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4491.
The EDIRPA aims at supporting cooperation in
“common procurement” defined as a cooperative
procurement jointly conducted by at least three
Member States. See Proposal for a Regulation on
Establishing the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act,
COM/2022/349 (July 19, 2022). The EDIRPA has a
budget of €500M. The Regulation would prescribe
eligible actions, such as those involving cooperation for common procurement of the most urgent
and critical defense products (excepting lethal
autonomous weapons), the possibility to appoint a
procurement agent on behalf of members, award
criteria which are stated in broad terms, and implementation through a work programme. In respect
of third countries, the proposed Regulation repeats
the language found in the EDF Regulation, namely,
that common procurement contracts will need to
be placed with legal entities established in the EU/
associated countries and are not subject to control
by third countries/entities (Art. 8). However, the
proposed Regulation also contains the same derogation permitting third country controlled contractor
and subcontractor participation in common procurement, provided guarantees are met. By way of
important update, on Nov. 11, 2022, it was reported
in the UK Financial Times that a new draft of the
EDIRPA was in circulation. Henry Foy, “EU Waters Down Its Buy-Local Defence Push,” Nov. 11,
2022, www.ft.com/content/7a7a194e-db09-45c79faa-7afc52aa9e29?sharetype=blocked. It has been
reported that Member States are now proposing a
“workaround” to allow the EU fund to support joint
purchases from third countries, not least to meet
short-term needs and restock arsenals depleted by
the necessity to supply weapons to Ukraine.
5
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As a further indication of increased EU incentivization for cooperative procurement, according
to the EU’s Strategic Compass, by early 2023 it
will publish a Commission proposal to enable a
VAT waiver to support the joint procurement and
ownership of defense capabilities which are the
result of collaboration within the EU. See European Commission, Questions and Answers: Commission Contribution to European Defence in the
Context of the Strategic Compass (Feb. 15, 2022),
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
QANDA_22_925. This appears to be the first publicized tax relief measure to incentivize EU collaborative procurement. Relatedly, the EDF may be
adjusted, and these changes may include reinforcement of the EDF’s bonus system applicable when
Member States commit to jointly acquire and/or
own the defense capabilities under development.
Conclusion—The EU’s ambition to develop
initiatives on cooperative defense procurement
are laudable. The Russian invasion of Ukraine
has bolstered the case for strengthened defense
cooperation within Europe, and that cooperation
almost certainly will be strongly supported by the
U.S., particularly if it strengthens NATO.
An important question is the perennial one—to
what extent, if at all, will this impact U.S. interests.
This Feature Comment has first advised caution;
we will need to wait and see. As indicated, putting
recent developments in historical context, the EU
has not been able to harness various initiatives
in defense procurement to develop anything close
to a strong sense of a uniform “European Defence
Technological Industrial Base” and “European Defence Equipment Market,” as so often mentioned
in policy documents. The European Defense and
Security Procurement Directive has not even been
fully implemented, and it has not facilitated a European preference to the exclusion of U.S. defense
firms. Moreover, while the EDF and PESCO are
important initiatives which signal the first solid
commitment to EU funding in defense, the sums
are relatively small, and they rely on a model of
voluntary participation of the limited number of
Member States who “can do” in defense, i.e., have
“credible” capability (which now means the ability
to dissuade a nuclear power from launching fullscale conventional forces on European territory,
not the ability to undertake basic peace keeping).
These do not come close to representing a “leveling
6
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up” of defense standards across the EU. Given the
annual U.S. defense spend (over $300 billion in
contract awards), a few billion euros for not just one
annual project but hundreds of projects over almost
a decade might lead the U.S. to question the value
of participation, except to continue to show strategic
influence in European defense.
While the EU has been tough on rhetoric in
seeking to render third country participation in
EU defense cooperation exceptional, the reality
is quite different. The legal instruments speak
for themselves. Both the EDF Regulation (on EU
funding for joint defense research and development) and the PESCO initiatives (Member State
cooperative efforts) allow third country participation subject to guarantees. Moreover, if the latest reports on the proposed Regulation for the
EDIRPA are to be believed, a further relaxation on
third country participation is intended. Of course,
the U.S. is also now participating in PESCO projects partially funded by the EDF. Even the United
Kingdom is participating in PESCO projects.
These fascinating developments are an important reminder that the EU must carefully consider
the third country implications of its EU defense
procurement initiatives. Of course, this is not
simply the case in respect of the U.S. (with the
U.S. negotiating influence on the EU instruments
plain to see or at least infer) but also the United
Kingdom, as “third country” participation will not
simply be synonymous with “the U.S.” Indeed, an
even thornier issue concerns the participation of
Turkey. The issue of how to address third country
participation also is not confined to defense, as
indicated by 2019 EU Guidance on third country
participation in the EU procurement market generally. single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/
new-guidance-participation-third-country-bidderseu-procurement-market-2019-07-24_en.
A final reflection is on John Donne’s observation
that “no man is an island.” Cooperation is not a case of
“U.S. and us” and “them.” The F-35 aircraft, for example, is not a uniquely U.S. project but a collaborative
effort involving many countries. Similarly, the Next
generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon is not uniquely
British but European. True cooperation requires coordination between international organizations (NATO/
EU), countries and multiple funding sources. If the
transatlantic alliance between the U.S. and the EU
will continue to evolve to meet the realities of events
© 2022 Thomson Reuters
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of the kind which have unfolded in Ukraine, careful
consideration must be given as to how that cooperation will operate not only politically but also legally.
On which point, this is a renewed call for lawyers to
get involved in the debate on ways to improve transatlantic defense cooperation. See Luke R.A. Butler,
“Transatlantic Defence Procurement: EU and U.S.
Defence Procurement Regulation in the Transatlantic
Defence Market” (Cambridge University Press 2017).
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